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INTRODUCTION
Online profiling is "the practice of tracking information about con-
sumers' interests by monitoring their movements online."' A primary
purpose of online profiling is to "deliver advertising tailored to the indi-
vidual's interests," a practice known as online behavioral advertising
(OBA).2 In order to accomplish this, publishers and advertisers track an
* J.D., University of Michigan Law School, 2011; Executive Note Editor, Michigan
Telecommunications and Technology Law Review. I am grateful to Professor Jessica Litman
for her insightful comments and to MTTLR's editors, particularly Liz Allen.
I. Glossary of Interactive Advertising Terms v. 2.0, INTERACTIVE ADVERTISING BUREAU,
20 (Oct. 17, 2001), http://www.iab.net/media/file/GlossaryoflnteractivAdvertisingTerms.pdf.
2. FED. TRADE COMM'N, SELF-REGULATORY PRINCIPLES FOR ONLINE BEHAVIORAL
ADVERTISING 1 (2009), available at http://www.ftc.gov/os/2009/02/PO85400behavadreport.pdf
[hereinafter 2009 REPORT]. The Federal Trade Commission includes tracking within its
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individual's online behavior using cookies and other means. Publishers
and advertisers aggregate the information, often compile it with informa-
tion from offline sources, and sort individuals into groups based on
characteristics such as age, income, and hobbies. Advertisers can then
purchase access to these consumer groups, controlling their selections
with such specificity that one commentator has compared the process of
choosing the most desirable targets to "fishing from a barrel."'
The online advertising industry has maintained that, far from being a
cause for concern, OBA and, by extension, online profiling are helpful to
consumers and provide significant economic benefits to publishers, the
advertising industry, and consumers. Consumer privacy advocates,
among others, argue that online profiling is an invasion of privacy, does
not accord with users' expectations, and even invites discriminatory
practices.
The benefits and dangers of online profiling continue to be disputed,
even as online profiling remains largely unregulated. Congress has not
passed any relevant legislation, and courts have proven unwilling to read
existing legislation to prohibit or limit online profiling. The Federal
Trade Commission (FTC) has made some efforts to address online pro-
filing, relying upon its authority over unfair and deceptive trade
practices.! Although the FTC has promoted and guided industry self-
regulation regarding OBA, it has recognized the need for "legislation
that would set forth a basic level for privacy protection for all visitors to
consumer-oriented commercial Web sites with respect to profiling."7 The
FTC is not alone in this view: at least two draft bills were presented to
definition of OBA. This blurs the line between online profiling and OBA, which extends the less
pejorative term-behavioral advertising-to the practice of tracking users. See Brian Stallworth,
Note, Future Imperfect: Googling for Principles in Online Behavioral Advertising, 62 FED.
CoMm. L.J. 465, 478 (2010). This Note will use "online profiling" to refer to the process of track-
ing individuals and "OBA" to refer to the delivery of targeted advertisements.
3. Ros GRAHAM, FISHING FROM A BARREL: USING BEHAVIOR TARGETING To REACH
THE RIGHT PEOPLE WITH THE RIGHT ADS AT THE RIGHT TIME 16 (2006), available at
http://online-behavior.com/wp-content/uploads/Fishing-From-a-Barrel.pdf.
4. See In re DoubleClick Inc. Privacy Litig., 154 F. Supp. 2d 497 (S.D.N.Y. 2001)
(holding that an Internet advertising corporation's use of cookies to track users did not violate
the Electronic Communications Privacy Act, the Federal Wiretap Act, or the Computer Fraud
and Abuse Act).
5. 15 U.S.C. § 45(a) (2006); see also FED. TRADE COMM'N, ONLINE PROFILING: A
REPORT TO CONGRESS 17 (2000), available at http://www.ftc.gov/os/2000/06/
onlineprofilingreportjune2000.pdf [hereinafter 2000 REPORT] ("The Commission's primary
legislative mandate is to enforce the Federal Trade Commission Act ('FTCA'), which prohib-
its unfair methods of competition and unfair or deceptive acts or practices in or affecting
commerce.. . .Commerce on the Internet falls within the scope of this statutory mandate.").
6. 2009 REPORT, supra note 2, at 481.
7. FED. TRADE COMM'N, ONLINE PROFILING: A REPORT TO CONGRESS, PART 2 REC-
OMMENDATIONS 10 (2000), available at http://www.ftc.gov/os/2000/07/onlineprofiling.pdf
[hereinafter 2000 REPORT PART 2].
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the 111th Congress;' the New York Assembly is debating a proposal;9 and
the Department of Commerce's Internet Policy Task Force has called for
the creation of a Privacy Policy Office.'0
Part I of this Note presents an overview of the technologies that en-
able online profiling and the ways in which the online advertising
industry uses gathered information to target users. Part II argues that leg-
islation regulating online profiling is necessary because profiling is a
harmful practice that users cannot prevent and for which no remedy is
available. Part III examines the FTC's recent proposal for a 'do not track'
mechanism and proposes elements that future legislation should include
in order to allow this mechanism to effectively address some of the con-
cerns online profiling raises.
I. WHAT IS ONLINE PROFILING?
A. Technology
Advertisers and publishers employ a variety of technologies to
amass records of users' online activities. Broadly speaking, these tech-
nologies enable an ongoing string of communication between a user's
computer and a website or an advertiser, allowing the website or adver-
tiser to follow the user within and between websites. This subsection
will provide a brief explanation of the ways in which two common
mechanisms-cookies and web beacons-and one developing mecha-
nism-HTML5-track individual behavior.
Cookies are small text files that store information on computers'
hard drives; web servers place them on hard drives and use them to re-
trieve the information they store. Cookies can contain unique
identification numbers, which allow servers to recognize and remember
users. They have many legitimate uses, such as storing users' prefer-
ences, passwords, and items in online shopping carts. They also allow
websites to track the activities of users within the site in order to im-
prove the site or to suggest products based on users' browsing histories."
Cookies are site-specific, but they can still be used to track users'
behavior across multiple sites. In addition to its own cookies, a website
8. Best Practices Act, H.R. 5777, 11Ith Cong. (2010); Boucher/Stearns Discussion
Draft, 11 Ith Cong. (2010) (on file with author).
9. Online Consumer Protection Act, Gen. Assemb. B. A4809, 2011 Leg., 234th Reg.
Sess. (N.Y. 2011).
10. DEP'T OF COMMERCE, COMMERCIAL DATA PRIVACY AND INNOVATION IN THE
INTERNET ECONOMY: A DYNAMIC POLICY FRAMEWORK 44-50 (2010), available at
http://www.ntia.doc.gov/reports/2010/IPTFPrivacyGreenPaper 12162010.pdf.
11. Marshall Brain, How Internet Cookies Work, HOWSTUFFWORKS, http://computer.
howstuffworks.com/cookie.htm (last visted Mar. 8, 2011).
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might allow a third party to place a cookie on a user's hard drive. For
example, the ad network DoubleClick might place a cookie on a user's
computer when the user visits a website that displays ads supplied by
DoubleClick. If the user then visits an unrelated site on which Double-
Click also advertises, DoubleClick will recognize the cookie it
previously deposited and be able to track the user's activities on both
sites. This tracking can continue across as many websites as an adver-
tiser has cookies, allowing an advertiser to build a detailed profile of a
user's online activity.12
Users can delete standard cookies using a browser's controls. How-
ever, at least two permutations-the Flash cookie and the Evercookie-
evade simple deletion. Adobe's Flash software allows websites to store
up to twenty-five times the amount of information of a regular cookie.
This permits large sound and video files to pre-load enough information
to ensure smooth playback. The software can also store data from cook-
ies, recreating cookies with the same unique identification number even
after a user deletes the originals." As a result, Flash cookies are difficult
to remove permanently. "Erasing HTTP cookies, clearing history, erasing
the cache, or choosing a delete private data option" are all ineffective, as
is the use of a "Private Browsing" setting.14 Users can control their Flash
player privacy settings through the Settings Manager, but the interface is
so confusing that Adobe fears users will mistake the actual Settings
Manager for a static, instructional image." The Evercookie is even more
persistent than Flash cookies. It stores cookie data in up to thirteen loca-
tions; when a user deletes information from one location, the remaining
locations recreate it.'6 Needless to say, this makes it difficult for users to
find and delete all copies before the remaining copies regenerate them."
12. Id.
13. Ashkan Soltani et al., Flash Cookies and Privacy 3 (Aug. 10, 2009) (unpublished
manuscript), available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract-id=1446862 ("We
found that taking the privacy-conscious step of deleting HTTP cookies to prevent unique
tracking could be circumvented through 'respawning' . . . . The flash cookie value would be
rewritten in the standard HTTP cookie value, thus subverting the user's attempt to prevent
tracking.").
14. Id. at 1.
15. Flash Player: Settings Manager-Global Privacy Settings Panel, ADOBE,
http://www.macromedia.com/support/documentation/en/flashplayer/help/settings-manager02.
html#l 18539 (last visited Mar. 8, 2011) ("Note: The Settings Manager that you see above is
not an image; it is the actual Settings Manager. Click the tabs to see different panels .. . .").
16. Samy Kamkar, Evercookie-Never Forget, SAMY.PL (Sept. 20, 2010), http://samy.pl/
evercookie/.
17. Jacqui Cheng, Zombie Cookie Wars: Evil Tracking API Meant to "Raise Aware-
ness," ARs TECHNICA, http://arstechnica.com/web/news/2010/09/evercookie-escalates-the-
zombie-cookie-war-by-raising-awareness.ars (last visited Apr. 11, 2011) (referring to the
process of deleting Flash cookies as "a daunting task even for the relatively experienced
surfer").
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For all their variety, cookies are just one of many mechanisms that
track users. Web beacons are another. Unlike cookies, which are stored
on users' computers, web beacons are embedded in web pages' HTML
codes, typically as small graphics. Whenever a user accesses a website,
the browser transmits information to the website's servers; this informa-
tion typically includes the IP address of a user's computer, the URL
requested, the type of browser, and so on. Third parties who have placed
web beacons on a website can also view this information.' Web beacons
can even communicate with third-party cookies, allowing the tracker to
identify the individual user if the IP address alone did not already allow
it to do so.19
HTML5 enables new developments in user tracking practices.20
HTML5 is the fifth iteration of the Hyper Text Markup Language, the
code used to create web pages. It is able to collect and store large
amounts of data on users' hard drives. This has many advantages; for
instance, it will make it possible to access multimedia content without
relying on third-party software such as Adobe's Flash player, and it will
allow users to check e-mail offline.2 1 However, the greater quantity of
information stored on users' hard drives will permit trackers to acquire
even more information about them. Furthermore, some devices, includ-
ing the iPhone and iPad, do not allow users to clear the browser
databases stored on their devices, making it impossible to avoid track-
22ing. Faced with these capabilities, Pam Dixon, the executive director of
the World Privacy Forum, has warned, "HTML5 opens Pandora's box of
tracking in the Internet."23
18. Web Beacons and Other Tools, ALL ABOUT COOKIES, http://www.allaboutcookies.
org/web-beacons/index.html (last visited Mar. 8, 2011).
19. Joshua Gomez et al., KnowPrivacy, KNOwPRIVACY, 8-9 (June 1, 2009), http://
www.knowprivacy.org/report/KnowPrivacyFinal Report.pdf.
20. This new standard has not yet been ratified, although some sites are already
employing it. Mikal E. Belicove, Understanding HTML5 and Why It Matters, ENTREPRE-
NEUR.COM DAILY DOSE (Feb. 4, 2010), http://blog.entrepreneur.com/2010/02/
understanding-html5-and-why-it-matters.php.
21. See, e.g., Tanzina Vega, New Webcode Draws Concern Over Privacy Risks, N.Y.
TIMES, Oct. 10, 2010, at Al, available at http://www.nytimes.com/2010/10/l1lbusiness/
media/l lprivacy.html?pagewanted=1&_r-l&hp; Iljitsch van Beijnum, Safari Team: "Webkit
Does HTML5 Client-side Database Storage," ARs TECHNICA, http://arstechnica.com/apple/
news/2007/10/safari-team-webkit-does-html5-client-side-database-storage.ars (last visited
Apr. 11, 2011).
22. Jacqui Cheng, Advertisers Get Hands Stuck in HTML5 Database Cookie Jar, ARS
TECHNICA, http://arstechnica.com/apple/news/2010/09/ridguid-tracking-cookies-in-safari-database-
form.ars (last visited Apr. 11, 2011).
23. Vega, New Webcode, supra note 21.
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Cookies, web beacons, and HTML5 are by no means the only track-
ing mechanisms that exist.2 4 Nonetheless, they do provide a snapshot of
the advantages and potential pitfalls of common tracking technologies.
While, they enable many of the features on which online sites rely, in-
cluding shopping carts and the ability to view videos, they also enable
user tracking and can evade deletion through a variety of regenerative
tactics.
B. Industry
"The essence of the advertising industry is to solve a massive match-
ing problem: a large number of advertisers want to deliver multiple
messages to a large number of consumers."25 OBA, which is only one
form of online advertising, allows advertisers to make more efficient de-
cisions regarding which users are likely to respond to which
advertisements. The premise of OBA is fairly simple. The more an ad-
vertiser watches a consumer, the more likely it is to learn about him; the
more an advertiser learns about a consumer, the more accurately the ad-
vertiser can suggest an offer that meets the consumer's needs.26 Recent
studies have upheld this theory. One found that OBA improves click-
through rates by 670% over "run of network advertising,"27 and another
study sponsored by the Network Advertising Initiative found that the
percentage of clicks from OBA that resulted in sales was more than
twice that of run of network advertising.28 Graham compares run of net-
work advertising to "passing fliers out on a busy street corner,"29 whereas
OBA presents advertisers with the opportunity "to start real conversa-
tions with consumers who represent real customers and not just random
passersby."o
24. See, e.g., Andrew N. Person, Behavioral Advertising Regulation: How the Negative
Perception of Deep Packet Inspection Technology May Be Limiting the Online Experience, 62
FED. COMM. L.J. 435, 439 (2010) ("Currently, DPI provides information about the online
tendencies of Internet users by reviewing search engine queries, recognizing trends with the
frequency of consumer Web site visits, and recording the types of applications that consumers
are using online.").
25. David S. Evans, The Online Advertising Industry: Economics, Evolution, and Pri-
vacy, J. ECON. PERSP., Summer 2009, at 37, 43.
26. GRAHAM, supra note 3, at 16.
27. HOWARD BEALEs, THE VALUE OF BEHAVIORAL TARGETING 11 n.9 (2010) (citing
JUN YAN ET AL., How MUCH CAN BEHAVIORAL TARGETING HELP ONLINE ADVERTISING?
(2009)), available at http://www.networkadvertising.org/pdfs/Beales-NAlStudy.pdf. "Run
of network advertising" refers to the placement of an ad by an ad network across its entire
network. Id. at 20. Thus, all users visiting all sites from whom the advertiser purchases space
will see the same ad.
28. Id. at 12.
29. GRAHAM, supra note 3, at 79.
30. Id. at 5.
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How does this all work? The FTC explains, "Consumer data can be
analyzed and combined with 'psychographic' data from third-party
sources, data on the consumer's offline purchases, or information col-
lected directly from consumers through surveys and registration forms.
This enhanced data allows the advertising networks to make a variety of
inferences about each consumer's interests and preferences."" For ex-
ample, a user might search for flights to New York on a travel site, at
which time an advertiser installs a cookie. The user then visits the web-
site of a local newspaper, which is part of the same advertising network,
to read about a local sports team. The advertiser at the news site recog-
nizes its cookie, sees that the user has an interest in both travel to New
York and sports, and displays an ad referring to the New York Yankees.32
A variety of different parties may participate in collecting, aggregat-
ing, and disseminating information about users and using that
information to buy and sell ad space. The FTC's pictorial representation
of the "personal data ecosystem" shows that retail and content sites, so-
cial networking sites, and search engines all track users. They sell or
share the information with affiliates, information brokers, web sites,
catalog co-ops, and ad network and analytic companies; these parties, in
turn, sell or share the information with banks, employers, marketers, the
media, the government, law enforcement, lawyers and private investiga-
tors, individuals, and product and service delivery companies.
Of these many parties, publishers, ad networks, and analytics com-
panies are the most involved in OBA. Howard Beales, former Director of
the Bureau of Consumer Protection at the FTC, explains,
Large publishers with diverse content offerings can use behav-
ioral targeting across their various sites to offer their users more
targeted ads. Additionally, third party firms can specialize in
parts of this process or can encompass all of it, offering targeting
across a broad range of publisher content. For example, data ex-
changes specialize in data collection and analytics that they sell
to advertisers. More comprehensive third party advertising net-
works . .. can handle both the collection, analytics, and
servicing of the ads.34
31. 2000 REPORT, supra note 5, at 5.
32. 2009 REPORT, supra note 2, at 3-4.
33. FED. TRADE COMM'N, PROTECTING CONSUMER PRIVACY IN AN ERA OF RAPID
CHANGE: A PROPOSED FRAMEWORK FOR BUSINESSES AND POLICYMAKERS app. C (2010),
available at http://www.ftc.gov/os/2010/12/101201privacyreport.pdf [hereinafter 2010 RE-
PORT].
34. BEALES, supra note 27, at 12.
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DoubleClick is a well-known example of a third-party advertising net-
work. Many websites wish to rent online "space" to advertisers in which
advertisers may display ads, such as the banners commonly seen at the
top of a webpage. DoubleClick acts as an intermediary between websites
and advertisers, promising advertisers that it will display their ads on
webpages to users who match the desired demographic."
Websites sell their advertising space though a bidding process. For
example, an advertiser may inform a third-party advertising network that
the advertiser will pay a given amount to display ads to users with cer-
tain characteristics. When such a user visits a website, the ad network
submits the advertiser's bid, and the highest bidder wins the ability to
display their ad to that user.3 6 The largest ad exchanges place billions of
ads each day," and the development of real-time bidding (RTB) allows
advertisers to target users with ever-increasing specificity. Previously,
advertisers had to predict in advance who was likely to visit a page and
place their bids accordingly. RTB allows advertisers to bid to serve ads
in the milliseconds it takes for a page to load, providing advertisers with
an opportunity to evaluate their bid based on the specific user requesting
the page.
II. THE NEED FOR REGULATION
A. Online Profiling Is a Harmful Practice
The average person expects some control over information relating
to him or her. This is evident in the strong public outcries against
changes in the privacy policies of common sites, such as Facebook and
Google. For instance, Google suffered widespread condemnation when it
introduced Google Buzz, because Buzz automatically published lists of
followers based on the people a user contacted the most.39 Google ulti-
35. In re DoubleClick Inc. Privacy Litig., 154 F. Supp. 2d 497, 502 (S.D.N.Y. 2001).
36. Christian Borgs et al., Dynamics of Bid Optimization in Online Advertisement
Auctions 1-2 (2007) (unpublished manuscript), available at http://www2007.org/papers/
paper089.pdf (providing a discussion of the bidding process for search-based advertising).
37. Complaint at 2, Real-time Targeting and Auctioning, Data Profiling Optimization,
and Economic Loss to Consumers and Privacy (filed F.T.C. Apr. 8, 2010) (Complaint, Re-
quest for Investigation, Injunction, and Other Relief) (stating that "Yahoo's Right Media
Exchange processes 9 billion transactions daily" and "MediaMath serves more than '13 billion
impressions a day"').
38. Stephanie Clifford, Instant Ads Set the Pace on the Web, N.Y. TIMEs, Mar. 11, 2010,
at BI, available at http://www.nytimes.com/2010/03/12/business/media/12adco.html?_r-I.
39. See, e.g., Nicholas Carlson, Warning: Google Buzz Has a Huge Privacy Flaw, Bus.
INSIDER (Feb. 10, 2010, 4:49 PM), http://www.businessinsider.com/warning-google-buzz-has-a-
huge-privacy-flaw-2010-2; Evgeny Morozov, Wrong Kind of Buzz Around Google Buzz, NET
EFFECT (Feb. 11, 2010, 6:20 AM), http://neteffect.foreignpolicy.com/posts/2010/02/l l/wrongL
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mately faced a class action lawsuit, which it has preliminarily agreed to
settle for $8.5 million.40 Meanwhile, even those users who do not appear
incensed over Facebook's regular privacy-related gaffes fill Facebook's
blogs with requests for greater control over the information they share.42
The expectation of control over personal information is also evident
in a number of traditional conceptions of privacy. Daniel Solove, a pro-
fessor at the George Washington University Law School, summarized
three concepts that are particularly relevant to the control of informa-
tion.43 The first is a right of "limited access to the self." As explained by
an early theorist, E.L. Godkin, this includes "the right of every man to
keep his affairs to himself, and to decide for himself to what extent they
shall be the subject of public observation and discussion."" Second, and
closely associated with the concept of limited access, is the constitution-
ally recognized expectation that confidential information will remain so,
what Solove terms "secrecy."4 A third approach believes that the core of
privacy is the ability to control when and with whom a party shares his
personal information.46 Common to all of these theories is the idea that
people should retain some measure of control over information related to
them.
People's expectation that they can control such information extends
to online activities. One study found that sixty-two percent of Americans
believe that websites with privacy policies cannot share information
kind of buzz around-google.buzz; Robin Wauters, Google Buzz Privacy Issues Have Real Life
Implications, TECHCRUNCH (Feb. 12, 2010), http://techcrunch.com/2010/02/12/google-buzz-
privacy.
40. Overview of the Proposed Settlement, GOOGLE Buzz USER PRIVACY LITIGATION,
http://www.buzzclassaction.com (last visited Mar. 27, 2010).
41. See Facebook Privacy, EPIC.ORG, http://epic.org/privacy/facebook/ (last visited
Mar. 27, 2011) (providing an extensive compilation of news regarding Facebook).
42. See, e.g., Nadia M. DeMartino, Comment to Improving Transparency Around Pri-
vacy, THE FACEBOOK BLOG (Dec. 23, 2010, 8:10 AM), http://blog.facebook.com/blog.
php?post=167389372130 ("I don't enjoy how everyone can see every little thing I write on
someone's wall."); Jared Drew, Comment to Updates on Your New Privacy Tools, THE FACE-
BOOK BLOG (June 2, 2010, 4:55 PM), http://blog.facebook.com/blog.phppost=1979 4 39021 3 0
("I don't want them to know who's [sic] friends we share mutually."); Roberta A. Morad,
Comment to New Tools to Control Your Experience, THE FACEBOOK BLOG (Oct. 18, 2010,
1:06 AM), http://blog.facebook.com/blog.php?post=196629387130 ("WE [sic] the FB Mem-
bers need to decide whether we want our phone contacts and email addresses to be public
from Yahoo or MSN etc.").
43. Daniel J. Solove, Conceptualizing Privacy, 90 CALIF. L. REV. 1087, 1099-124
(2002). Solove ultimately argues that each of these conceptualizations, even the very act of
creating an overarching conception of privacy, is inherently over- or under-inclusive. Id. at
I 125-26. Nonetheless, the categories present a useful summary of accepted concepts of pri-
vacy.
44. Id. at 1103.
45. Id. at 1106 (citing Whalen v. Roe, 429 U.S. 589 (1977)).
46. Id. at 1109-10.
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about users with other companies without first obtaining users' permis-
sion, and when asked if companies must have permission to follow users
across multiple sites, the majority of respondents believed that this was
true or did not know. 47 This widespread, erroneous understanding of
tracking and online profiling practices indicates that these practices are
contrary to users' intuitive privacy expectations.
Once users are aware of online profiling, their reactions to the prac-
tice range from simple concern to feelings of violation, again
demonstrating an expectation that the practice should not be the norm.
One survey found that seventy-two percent of consumers are "con-
cerned" that their activities are tracked online, and ninety-three percent
believe companies should not use personal information without permis-
sion.48 Another survey shows that sixty-six percent of American
respondents do not want to receive tailored advertising, and eighty-four
percent reject tailored advertising that involves tracking their behavior
between websites. 49 After receiving OBA for the first time, one advertis-
ing executive even admitted, "Intellectually I have totally accepted
behavioral targeting and even welcome it as an advertiser, but emotion-
ally and as a prospect, I'm still not sure. I had no idea I would be so
prudish about this until it actually happened. . . . I do feel a little vio-
lated."0
Online profiling is a harmful practice precisely because it is contrary
to traditional concepts of privacy and user expectations, which both re-
flect the belief that privacy includes some measure of control over
personal information. Just as a "Peeping Tom" offends by viewing vic-
tims in places in which the victims expect to be out of the public view,
publishers and advertisers harm users by following their activities
through areas in which the users-rightly or wrongly-believe them-
selves to be unobserved.
Although the violation of user expectations may fall outside of le-
gally cognizable privacy-related harms, the FTC argues that "the actual
range of privacy-related harms is much wider and includes reputational
harm, as well as the fear of being monitored or simply having private
47. Joseph Turow et al., Contrary to What Marketers Say, Americans Reject Tailored
Advertising and Three Activities That Enable It, SSRN, 21 (Sept. 29, 2009), http://papers.
ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstractid= 1478214.
48. Consumer Reports Poll: Americans Extremely Concerned About Internet Privacy,
CONSUMERSUNION.ORG (Sept. 25, 2008), http://www.consumersunion.org/pub/core-telecom-
and utilities/006189.html.
49. Turow et al., supra note 47, at 14.
50. Gord Hotchkiss, Hello, My Name Is Gord, and I've Been Behaviorally Targeted,
SEARCH INSIDER (Apr. 12, 2007, 9:30 AM), http://www.mediapost.com/publications/
index.cfm?fuseaction=Articles.showArticle&art aid=58602.
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information 'out there.' 5' The FTC's new approach to conceptualizing
the harms of online profiling fits within other calls for a more flexible
approach to privacy. Solove, for instance, argues that "not all privacy
problems are the same, and different conceptions of privacy work best in
different contexts. Instead of trying to fit new problems into old concep-
tions, we should seek to understand the special circumstances of a
particular problem."52 Under the FTC's new approach, online profiling is
harmful precisely because it occurs despite user's expectations and
wishes to the contrary.
Online profiling is harmful not only because it is contrary to expec-
tations, but also because it limits the options available to users. Martin
Abrams has termed this "boxing." Boxing occurs when "a consumer's
vision and choices are limited by his or her digital history and the ana-
lytics that make judgments based on that digital history."" This may take
the form of variable pricing, a practice in which retailers review a user's
past searching and buying history and adjust their prices to reflect the
user's perceived willingness to pay more.54 Beyond mere pricing, online
profiling may affect options presented to consumers regarding major
financial decisions. For example, Capital One admits that it uses brows-
ing history to suggest different credit cards to different individuals," and
the Center for Digital Democracy presents the possibility that sub-prime
mortgage lenders might have used online profiling to target low-income
56black and Hispanic Internet users. At least one user claims to have re-
ceived different loan offers depending on which Internet browser he
used.17 The Fair Credit Reporting Act governs the actual lending prac-
tices of these institutions; however, nothing limits their ability to suggest
or promote certain offers, and users who are unaware of OBA may not
51. 2010 REPORT, supra note 33, at 20.
52. Solove, supra note 43, at 1147.
53. Martin Abrams, Guest Headnote, Boxing and Concepts of Harm, 4 PRIVACY &
DATA SEC. L.J. 673, 673 (2009).
54. Annie Lowrey, How Much Is That Doggie in the Browser Window?, SLATE (Dec.
6, 2010, 6:25 PM), http://www.slate.com/id/2276918; see also Joseph Turow et al., Open to
Exploitation: America's Shoppers Online and Offline 10 (June 1, 2005) (unpublished manu-
script), available at http://repository.upenn.edu/asc-papers/35/.
55. However, Capital One denies using the information to make lending decisions.
Emily Steel & Julia Angwin, On the Web's Cutting Edge, Anonymity in Name Only, WALL
ST. J., Aug. 4, 2010, at Al, available at http://online.wsj.com/article/SB 10001424052748703
294904575385532109190198.html.
56. CENTER FOR DIGITAL DEMOCRACY & U.S. PUB. INTEREST RESEARCH GROUP,
COMPLAINT AND REQUEST FOR INQUIRY AND INJUNCTIVE RELIEF CONCERNING UNFAIR AND
DECEPTIVE ONLINE MARKETING PRACTICES 33-34 (2007), available at http://www.
centerfordigitaldemocracy.org/sites/default/files/FTCsupplemental-statementl l07_0.pdf.
57. CmdrTaco, Do Firefox Users Pay More for Car Loans?, SLASHDOT (Nov. 4, 2010,
9:21 AM), http:/Inews.slashdot.org/story/l0/11/04/132257/Do-Firefox-Users-Pay-More-For-
Car-Loans.
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know to actively seek out options other than those advertisers initially
suggest based upon the user's profile. Abrams aptly notes the irony that
the Internet, a powerful information tool, should become a means of lim-
iting users' options and perspectives, and-just as the FTC calls for
setting aside the traditional harms-based approach-Abrams calls for
recognition of a new "social" harm: the inability to leave the box."
Even as online profiling determines the very options presented to
consumers, there is currently no way to ensure that an individual con-
sumer's compiled profile is accurate. Tracking is tied to computers, not
users. If multiple people use the same computer, the resulting profile
may not be an accurate reflection of any of them. Confusion can result
from just one user's actions: consumers do not research only those mat-
ters that relate directly to them. If a user researches eating disorders and
spends time on pro-Ana websites 9 in an effort to learn about a friend's
eating disorder, will a life insurance company believe that the user suf-
fers from the disease or is at risk of developing an eating disorder?6
These inaccuracies highlight the dangers of basing discriminatory adver-
tising on information gathered through profiling. The risk of harm
extends beyond delivery of OBA; the FTC reports that "some data bro-
kers sell identity verification services to various public and private
entities," and inaccurate information can cause such entities to deny
61benefits to eligible consumers.
Finally, online profiling relies upon the collection of vast quantities
of information. One author argues that, as a result of such large data-
bases, "[a]lmost every person in the developed world can be linked to at
58. Abrams, supra note 53, at 675.
59. "Pro-Ana" websites promote an anorexic lifestyle. See, e.g., Bonnie Rothman Mor-
ris, A Disturbing Growth Industry: Web Sites That Espouse Anorexia, N.Y. TIMES, Jun. 23,
2002, § 15, at 8, available at http://query.nytimes.com/gst/fullpage.html?res=9F 00E4DBl23
CF930A l5755COA9649C8B63&sec=&spon=&pagewanted=all.
60. Recent research by life insurance companies shows that consumer profiles, based in
large part on information gathered from online activity, can be as accurate a predictor of lon-
gevity as medical tests. Leslie Scism & Mark Maremont, Insurers Test Data Profiles to
Identify Risky Clients, WALL ST. J., Nov. 19, 2010, at Al, available at http://
online.wsj.com/article/SBI0001424052748704648604575620750998072986.html?mod=WSJ
article-related. It remains unclear how this use of data would fare under the Fair Credit Re-
porting Act or insurance regulations, but life insurers might one day use it to determine
eligibility for coverage or set premiums. Natasha Singer, Privacy Groups Fault Online Health
Sites for Sharing User Data with Marketers, N.Y. TIMEs, Nov. 23, 2010, at B3, available at
http://www.nytimes.com/2010/11/24/business/24drug.html?_r-I&scp=1&sq=Privacy%2OGro
ups%20Fault%200nline%2Health%2Sites%20for%2OSharing%2User%2Data%20with
%20Marketers&st=cse.
61. 2010 REPORT, supra note 33, at 48.
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least one fact in a computer database that an adversary could use for
blackmail, discrimination, harassment, or financial or identity theft."
B. Users Cannot Effectively Prevent Online Profiling
Several studies have demonstrated that consumers are unaware of the
63
extent of tracking that occurs. As an initial matter, if users do not know
about online profiling and online tracking, they do not realize they
should take what limited protective measures exist. Even those users
who do wish to take protective measures have very few options.
Current industry practice relies upon a "notice-and-choice" regime.
The notice-and-choice model "encourages companies to develop privacy
notices describing their information collection and use practices to con-
sumers, so that they can make informed choices."64 However, use of a
website constitutes consent to its privacy terms. It is almost laughable to
think that such a system grants users any real means of preventing un-
wanted tracking. Most privacy policies are in lengthy legalese; few users
are willing-or able-to read and understand them. Indeed, one study
shows that the majority of users mistakenly believe that the mere exis-
tence of a privacy policy means that websites will not share their
information.6 Assuming a user reads and understands a privacy policy,
his or her only means of objecting to its profiling practices is to leave the
website; this effectively prevents the use of any website.
The Network Advertising Initiative (NAI), a group of online adver-
tising companies, purportedly eases the burden on consumers by
requiring its members to meet certain privacy standards; consumers who
visit member sites can presumably trust the websites' privacy practices
without needing to review each privacy policy. However, compliance
with the NAI is not monitored by an independent third party. The Center
for Democracy and Technology argues that this is necessary because
most consumers do not have the ability to identify violations,6 and the
self-interested industry cannot be "player, referee, and rule maker."67
62. Paul Ohm, Broken Promise of Privacy: Responding to the Surprising Failure of
Anonymization, 57 UCLA L. REV. 1701, 1748 (2010).
63. Turow et al., supra note 47.
64. 2010 REPORT, supra note 33, at iii.
65. Turow et al., supra note 47, at 21.
66. CENTER FOR DEMOCRACY AND TECHNOLOGY, RESPONSE TO THE 2008 NAI PRINCI-
PLES: THE NETWORK ADVERTISING INITIATIVE'S SELF-REGULATORY CODE OF CONDUCT FOR
ONLINE BEHAVIORAL ADVERTISING 4 (2008), available at http://www.cdt.org/privacy/
20081216_NAlresponse.pdf.
67. Marvin Ammori, Op-Ed., Impose Real Privacy Rules, N.Y. TIMES (Dec. 2, 2010,
3:41 PM), http://www.nytimes.com/roomfordebate/2010/12/02/a-do-not-call-registry-for-the-
web/impose-real-privacy-rules.
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Thus, membership in the NAI is not an effective indicator of websites'
privacy practices.
In addition, there are several "seal" programs that purportedly in-
crease the effectiveness of the notice-and-choice regime. These programs
establish certain privacy standards and place their seal on websites meet-
ing those standards. In theory, the seals-or absence thereof-alert users
to websites' practices without requiring users to read every privacy pol-
icy.68 Unfortunately, the seal programs do not meet these goals. Seal
programs rarely withdraw seals in response to violations; indeed, the
program administrators are often unaware of violations. Not only do dif-
ferent programs set different requirements, but individual seal programs
do not require uniformity among the sites they certify.69
Users may "opt out" of tracking by individual companies, but this is
also inadequate. For instance, a user may visit the DoubleClick website
and select an option to block tracking by DoubleClick.70 It would be ex-
tremely difficult for a user to individually opt out of all tracking in this
way; the user would not only have to visit each site but also figure out
which sites to visit in the first place.
Some industry groups do provide a single site at which users may opt
out of tracking by some or all members, but this is not an effective solu-
tion. First, users must identify the relevant industry groups. Second, the
industry chooses the opt-out mechanism available to users. For example,
the NAI allows users to replace its members' cookies with "opt-out cook-
ies" specific to each member, preventing the member from using its
cookie to track the user.7' However, whenever users delete their cookies,
they also delete the NAI opt-out cookie; some security protection pro-
68. See, e.g., TRUSTE, http://www.truste.com/index.html (last visited Dec. 7, 2010).
69. Ethan Hayward, Note, The Federal Government As Cookie Inspector: The Con-
sumer Privacy Protection Act of 2000, 11 DEPAUL-LCA J. ART & ENT. L. & POL'Y 227,
233-35 (2001). The lack of uniformity between programs means that consumers have to fa-
miliarize themselves with with each seal program's requirements.
70. Advertising and Privacy, GOOGLE, http://www.google.com/privacy/ads/ (last vis-
ited Jan. 16, 2011).
71. How Does the NA! Opt-out Tool Work?, NETWORK ADVERTISING INITIATIVE,
http://www.networkadvertising.org/managing/faqs.asp#question_9 (last visited Apr. 10,
2011); Opt Out of Behavioral Advertising, NETWORK ADVERTISING INITIATIVE,
http://www.networkadvertising.org/managing/opt-out.asp (last visited Apr. 10, 2011). In
addition, the NAI has recently unveiled an "Advertising Option Icon," which is to be displayed
near advertisements; users can click on the icon to learn more about the company's data col-
lection and access an opt-out option. Press Release, Network Advertising Initiative, Major
Marketing/Media Trade Groups Launch Program to Give Consumers Enhanced Control over
Collection and Use of Web Viewing Data for Online Behavioral Advertising (Oct. 4, 2010),
available at http://www.networkadvertising.org/pdfs/Associationsl 04release.pdf.
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grams even delete opt-out cookies in their normal course of operations.
Regardless of the cause, deletion requires the user to opt out all over
again. Finally, the membership of an industry group determines the ef-
fectiveness of opting out. For example, the NAI simply does not apply to
non-members, some of whom have troubling practices,74 and member-
ship is subject to change without notice."
Users who do attempt to control tracking through the tools individ-
ual websites offer face another hurdle: the settings are often so confusing
and complex as to be unusable. For examples, one need only look at the
Google dashboard,( Adobe's Settings Manager,7 or the Facebook pri-
vacy tool.78
Some Internet browsers have introduced tools designed to assist us-
ers who wish to block tracking; however, these are of limited use. The
latest iteration of Microsoft's Internet Explorer browser, IE9, will in-
clude a "Tracking Protection List" into which users can enter sites the
browser may not "call" unless the user grants permission, but the list is
empty by default.79 To avoid creating a cumbersome opt-in mechanism
that will place a large burden on users to identify and enter each individ-
ual site they wish to block, IE9 will allow third parties to create lists that
users may adopt in their entirety.o However, users who wish to block all
tracking cannot select that option; they must instead invest substantial
resources in personal research or rely on third parties to be thorough and
keep their lists updated.
72. Pam Dixon, The Network Advertising Initiative: Failing at Consumer Protection
and at Self-Regulation, WORLD PRIVACY FORUM, 17-18 (Nov. 2, 2007),
http://www.worldprivacyforum.org/pdflWPFNAlreportNov2 2007fs.pdf.
73. Google has recently introduced a plug-in for its browser, Chrome, that will prevent
deletion of opt-out cookies. JC Torpey, 'Keep My Opt Out' Chrome Extension Is a Supercharged
Google Ad Preferences Manager, YAHOO! (Jan. 25, 2011, 6:26 PM), http://news.yahoo.com/
s/acl20110125/tc-acl7702460_keep my-opt.out chrome extensionis_a_superchargedgoogle
adpreferencesmanager. However, only Chrome's users benefit from this.
74. For instance, RapLeaf is not a member of the NAI. RapLeaf attaches names to the
personally identifiable information it collects, and its efforts to strip that information before
selling it have not always been thorough. Emily Steel, A Web Pioneer Profiles Users
by Name, WALL ST. J., Oct. 25, 2010, at Al, available at http://online.wsj.com/article/
SBI0001424052702304410504575560243259416072.html.
75. Dixon, supra note 72, at 14 ("When a member drops out of the NAI, a consumer
has no way to know if a previously set opt-out cookie for that member still functions.").
76. Google Dashboard, GOOGLE, http://www.google.comldashboard (last visited Dec.
7,2010).
77. Flash Player Help, supra note 15.
78. Facebook Privacy: A Bewildering Tangle of Options, N.Y. TIMES, May 12, 2010, at B8,
available at http://www.nytimes.com/interactive/2010/05/12/business/facebook-privacy.html.
79. Dean Hachamovitch, IE9 and Privacy: Introducing Tracking Protection, IEBLOG
(Dec. 7, 2010 10:10 AM), http://blogs.msdn.com/b/ie/archive/2010/12/07/ie9-and-privacy-
introducing-tracking-protection-v8.aspx.
80. Id.
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Google has also introduced a new feature to its Chrome browser:
"keep my opt-outs." This will prevent users from deleting opt-out cook-
ies when they clear their cookies."' However, this system still places a
burden on users to opt out of cookies in the first place, whether through
an incomplete organization, such as the NAI, or through individual com-
panies' websites. Furthermore, it only limits tracking by cookies; it will
not reach other tools, such as web bugs or HTML5.
In contrast to IE9 and Google's technology-based solutions, Mozilla
has announced an honor system: once a user has enabled the feature,
Mozilla will send a constant signal to advertisers, informing them that
82
the user does not wish to be tracked. The most obvious flaw with
Mozilla's system is that it expects advertisers to comply with users'
wishes. Finally, users may only enjoy these browser features when they
use the browser that offers them, and not all devices support these
browsers.83
Lastly, as discussed above, Flash cookies, Evercookies, and the in-
ability to clear browser databases when using HTML5 make it very
difficult for users to delete some undesired tracking mechanisms. 84
To summarize, users purportedly control online profiling through a
notice-and-choice regime under which use of a website constitutes con-
sent to the website's tracking practices. However, users do not read or
understand the lengthy privacy policies, and membership in the NAI or
participation in a seal program does not accurately indicate a website's
practices. Although a variety of opt-out mechanisms exist, they are cum-
bersome and ineffective. Accordingly, if users somehow receive effective
notice, their only choice is to desist from using the majority of web-
sites." In other words, users cannot effectively prevent unwanted online
profiling.
81. Torpey, supra note 73.
82. DoNotTrack FAQ, MOZILLAWIKI, https://wiki.mozilla.org/Privacy/Jan201 I-
DoNotTrackFAQ (last modified Jan. 24, 2011, 21:56).
83. For instance, Microsoft ceased development of Internet Explorer for Mac in 2003,
at which time IE5 was current. Jim Dairymple, Microsoft Drops Development of lEfor Mac,
PCWORLD (June 13, 2003, 6:00 PM), http://www.pcworld.com/article/ 11 158/microsoft
drops-developmentofie formac.html.
84. 2010 REPORT, supra note 33, at 65-66.
85. Cf Shaun A. Sparks, Comment, The Direct Marketing Model and Virtual Identity:
Why the United States Should Not Create Legislative Controls on the Use of Online Consumer
Personal Data, 18 DICK. INT'L L. ANN. 517, 549 (2000) (stating optimistically that "[olnline
businesses ... will compete in the arena of privacy service in the same manner in which they
compete on terms such as price").
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C. There Are Limited Remedies Available for Harms
Resulting from Online Profiling
Even as users lack effective means to prevent online profiling, only
limited remedies are available once online profiling has occurred. Courts
have resisted application of existing legislation to cookies. State and na-
tional legislatures have not yet passed regulations that would specifically
regulate online profiling, and recent proposals face numerous obstacles.
Until quite recently, the FTC has been noticeably hands-off, emphasizing
principles to guide industry self-regulation and future legislation. In
short, consumers lack adequate remedies.
1. Existing Legislation
None of the three pieces of federal legislation most likely to protect
users from online profiling-the Electronic Communications Privacy
Act, the Federal Wiretap Act, and the Computer Fraud and Abuse Act-
are applicable to online profiling. In the four cases directly addressing
the applicability of these statutes to online tracking mechanisms, courts
have consistently dismissed claims due to consent between websites and
advertisers and damage thresholds.
The Electronic Communications Privacy Act (ECPA) makes it an of-
fense to access without authorization "a facility through which an
electronic communication service is provided" and thus obtain "access
to a wire or electronic communication while it is in electronic storage in
such system." 6 This provision has not protected users from online profil-
ing because courts have held that ad servers fall within a statutory
exception, stating that the relevant section "does not apply with respect
to conduct authorized . . . by a user of that service with respect to a
communication of or intended for that user."8' In In re DoubleClick Inc.
Privacy Litigation, a federal district court held that, within the exception,
"user" refers to websites or servers. Thus, the exception applies to con-
duct authorized by websites rather than conduct authorized by individual
users. ' The court then held that, given its commercial relationships with
affiliated websites, those sites had authorized DoubleClick to access the
86. 18 U.S.C. § 2701(a) (2006).
87. 18 U.S.C. § 2701(c)(2).
88. In re DoubleClick Inc. Privacy Litig., 154 F. Supp. 2d 497, 509 (S.D.N.Y. 2001).
But see In re Intuit Privacy Litig., 138 F. Supp. 2d 1272, 1277 (C.D. Cal. 2001) ("If the thrust
of Defendant's 'third party' contention is that it was authorized to access data in Plaintiffs
computer, the court must reject it as it directly conflicts with Plaintiffs' allegations that De-
fendant was not so authorized, which allegations the court must accept as true for the purposes
of a Rule 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss."). However, the result in Intuit may be due to the proce-
dural posture-motion to dismiss-rather than the inherent strength of the argument. See In re
Toys R Us, Inc., Privacy Litig., No. C 00-2746 MMC, 2001 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 16947, at *13
(N.D. Cal. Oct. 9, 2001).
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GET, POST, and GIF communications sent by the plaintiffs to the web-
site.89 As a result DoubleClick's access to users' GET, POST, and GIF
communications fell within the statutory exception because they were
authorized by the websites. A similar result was reached in a case in
which plaintiffs filed a suit against Avenue A, an advertising network,
alleging that Avenue A was not authorized by websites that did not con-
tract directly with Avenue A but rather were re-routed to its servers by
DoubleClick. The court held that ECPA does not apply to parties to
whom communications are re-routed, and so it was sufficient that web-
sites had initially granted authorization to DoubleClick.90
The court in DoubleClick further held that ECPA does not even ap-
ply to cookies because they are not "electronic storage." Electronic
storage is "(a) any temporary, intermediate storage of a wire or elec-
tronic communication incidental to the electronic transmission thereof;
and (b) any storage of such communication by an electronic communica-
tion service for purposes of backup protection of such communication."9'
The court held that the requirement for temporary storage was not met
because users' computers store cookies for indefinite periods;9 2 the sec-
ond prong was not met because users are not "electronic communication
service[s]."' Even if cookies did fall within ECPA's provisions, the court
held that access to the identification numbers associated with each
cookie was internal communication within DoubleClick, and so Dou-
bleClick required no authorization to access them, though they were
stored on users' hard drives.
Courts have also held that the Federal Wiretap Act is inapplicable to
online tracking. The Federal Wiretap Act provides a private right of ac-
tion against the interception of electronic communications . The
plaintiffs in DoubleClick argued that DoubleClick intercepted communi-
cations between themselves and the websites they visited. However, an
exception to the Federal Wiretap Act provides that interception is not
unlawful where the interceptor "is a party to the communication or
89. DoubleClick, 154 F. Supp. 2d at 511. GET and POST queries allow users to type
information, such as search queries and personal information, into websites. GIF tags are web
beacons.
90. Chance v. Ave. A, Inc., 165 F. Supp. 2d 1153, 1161 (W.D. Wash. 2001).
91. 18 U.S.C. § 2510(17) (2006).
92. DoubleClick, 154 F. Supp. 2d at 511-13; see also Toys R Us, 2001 U.S. Dist.
LEXIS 16947, at * Il ("Just as in DoubleClick, plaintiffs here allege that the cookies at issue
remain 'indefinitely' on their computers ... and do not allege that the cookies are incidentally
stored in plaintiffs computers while awaiting final transmission to another location.").
93. DoubleClick, 154 F. Supp. 2d at 511; see also Toys R Us, 2001 U.S. Dist. LEXIS
16947, at *18 ("While the complaint clearly alleges that plaintiffs did not authorize Coremet-
rics to access their E91communications within websites, the statutory exception set forth in
§ 2701(c)(2) is applicable as long as one party to a communication provides consent.").
94. 18 U.S.C.S. § 2511(a) (Lexis Nexis 2011).
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where one of the parties to the communication has given prior consent to
such interception."95 The court in DoubleClick, applying an analysis
similar to its approach to ECPA, held that the parties to the communica-
tions were the websites and DoubleClick-not the plaintiffs-and the
websites had granted authorization.
Finally, although the Computer Fraud and Abuse Act (CFAA),
broadly speaking, prohibits unauthorized access to protected com-
puters,97 the limited availability of private rights of action makes it
inapplicable to tracking. The CFFA only allows civil actions against a
party who "intentionally accesses a protected computer without authori-
zation and, as a result of such conduct, recklessly causes damage.""
Damage, in turn, "means any impairment to integrity or availability of
data, a program, a system, or information."99 Furthermore, the offense
must have caused damages "aggregating at least $5000 in value."'" As an
initial matter, a properly functioning tracking mechanism will not impair
data, programs, systems, or information; if it did, it would probably pre-
vent a user from engaging in the activities it is meant to track. Assuming,
that it did cause such damage, plaintiffs would have to overcome the
hurdle of showing recklessness. Finally, plaintiffs would have to meet
the damages threshold. Few did so successfully under an earlier version
of the statute, which defined "damage" as "any impairment to the integ-
rity or availability of data, a program, a system, or information that ...
causes loss aggregating at least $5,000 in value during any 1-year period
to one or more individuals."o'0 For instance, the court in DoubleClick
held that the plaintiffs could aggregate damages across victims and over
time but only with respect to a single act.102 Aggregation across victims
did not help the plaintiffs because DoubleClick committed different acts
95. 18 U.S.C.S. § 2511(2)(d).
96. DoubleClick, 154 F. Supp. 2d at 514; see also Chance v. Ave. A, Inc., 165 F. Supp.
2d 1153, 1162 (W.D. Wash. 2001) ("It is implicit in the web pages' code instructing the user's
computer to contact Avenue A, either directly or via DoubleClick's server, that the web pages
have consented to Avenue A's interception of the communication between them and the indi-
vidual user."); Toys R Us, 2001 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 16947, at *24-25.
97. 18 U.S.C.S. § 1030(a) (LexisNexis 2011).
98. 18 U.S.C.S. § 1030(a)(5)(B); see also 18 U.S.C.S. § 1030(g) ("A civil action for a
violation of this section may be brought only if the conduct involves I of the factors set forth
in subclauses (1), (11), (Ill), (IV), or (V) of subsection (c)(4)(A)(i)."); 18 U.S.C.
§ 1030(c)(4)(A)(i) ("The punishment for an offense under subsection (a) or (b) of this section
is ... except as provided in subparagraphs (E) and (F), a fine under this title, imprisonment
for not more than 5 years, or both, in the case of ... an offense under subsection (a)(5)(B).").
99. 18 U.S.C.S. § 1030(e)(8).
100. 18 U.S.C.S. § 1030(c)(4)(A)(i)(1).
101. 18 U.S.C. § 1030(e)(8) (2000) (amended 2001).
102. In re DoubleClick Inc. Privacy Litig., 154 F. Supp. 2d 497, 523-24 (S.D.N.Y.
2001).
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each time it accessed cookies on the millions of different computers. 0 3
Even if plaintiffs aggregated the repeated access of one cookie on one
user's computer across time, the court was not convinced that the harm
suffered by each plaintiff was valued at or above $5000.'4
2. Proposed Legislation
New legislation has not filled the gap left by ECPA, the Wiretap Act,
and CFAA. No legislative body has passed regulations that specifically
apply to online profiling, although several have offered proposals. A
New York bill would prohibit the collection of personally identifiable
information ("PII")05 without consent. It would also require an opt-out
option regarding the collection of non-PH, clear display of privacy poli-
cies on advertisers' home pages, and clear notice of advertisers' practices
by publishers. The bill allows the attorney general to bring actions for
violations. It imposes a fine of up to $250 per violation, and the court
may triple this fine upon finding a pattern or practice of either collecting
PH without consent or failing to allow users to opt out of the collection
of non-PIIH."o
At the national level, Representative Rush has proposed a bill that
would set standards for notice-and-choice procedures, including an opt-
out option for covered information and a requirement of express consent
regarding sensitive information. The bill grants the FTC rulemaking au-
thority with respect to the accuracy of data, allowing consumers limited
access to their data, and standards regarding data security, retention, and
accountability. The bill would create a private right of action but also
103. Id. at 524; cf In re Toys R Us, Inc., Privacy Litig., No. C 00-2746 MMC, 2001
U.S. Dist. LEXIS 16947, at *36 (N.D. Cal. Oct. 9, 2001) (aggregating plaintiffs' claims where
"defendants caused an identical file to be implanted in each of the plaintiffs' computers, re-
sulting in damages of a uniform nature").
104. DoubleClick, 154 F. Supp. 2d at 525-56; see also Chance v. Ave. A, Inc., 165 F.
Supp. 2d 1153, 1159 (W.D. Wash. 2001) ("Plaintiffs have not shown any facts that prove an
aggregate damage of over $5,000 for any single act of the Defendant, from either the initial
placement of an Avenue A cookie or a subsequent accessing of this cookie."); In re Intuit
Privacy Litig., 138 F. Supp. 2d 1272, 1281 (C.D. Cal. 2001) (holding that plaintiffs were un-
able to meet the damages requirement).
105. P11 is information that "by itself, can be used to identify, contact or locate a per-
son." Online Consumer Protection Act, Gen. Assemb. B. A4809, 2011 Leg., 234th Reg. Sess.
(N.Y. 2011); see also NETWORK ADVERTISING INITIATIVE, 2008 NAI PRINCIPLES: THE NET-
WORK ADVERTISING INITIATIVE's SELF-REGULATORY CODE OF CONDUCT 5 (2008) ("PH1
includes . . . any other data used or intended to be used to identify, contact or precisely locate
a person."). Note, however, that numerous commentators have questioned the merits of a
distinction between PII and non-Pll. See, e.g., 2009 REPORT, supra note 2, at iii; Ohm, supra
note 62.
106. N.Y. Assemb. B. A4809. The bill is currently under review by the Consumer Af-
fairs and Protection Committee. Legislative Detail: NY Assembly Bill 4809 - 2011 General
Assembly, ELOBBYIST, http://e-lobbyist.com/gaits/NY/AO4809 (last visited Mar. 8, 2011).
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create a "safe harbor" for companies that participate in an FTC-approved
self-regulatory program. The bill also permits enforcement by the FTC
and states' attorneys general.07
Representatives Boucher and Stearns have offered a more limited
draft. They would require notice-and-choice procedures that permit con-
sumers to opt out of the sharing of covered information and require
consumers to grant affirmative opt-in consent regarding sensitive infor-
mation. Their draft also creates more limited standards regarding data
accuracy and security. They would permit enforcement by the FTC and
states' attorneys general but would not allow a private right of action.'8
The fate of these bills is unclear. With the exception of the Chil-
dren's Online Privacy Protection Act, relevant legislative proposals have
all failed to pass.'" If successfully passed, any future national regulatory
scheme might preempt state legislation such as New York's."o In the
wake of recent developments including the FTC's and Department of
Commerce's new reports"' and Representative Boucher's failure to win
reelection," 2 the current proposals are likely to be both outdated and
dead in the water.
3. The FTC's Role
The FTC is "empowered and directed to prevent persons, partner-
ships, or corporations ... from using ... unfair or deceptive acts or
practices in or affecting commerce.""'3 Under that mandate, the FTC has
considered matters related to online privacy through public workshops
and hearings since 1995."4 Nonetheless, until recently, the FTC's ap-
proach could be best characterized as "wait and see."
In 1998, the FTC released a report on online privacy. It identified
five "fair information practices"-notice, choice, access, security, and
enforcement-and found that the majority of online businesses had not
adopted them. The FTC concluded that some added incentives were
107. Best Practices Act, H.R. 5777, 111 th Cong. (2010).
108. Boucher/Stearns Discussion Draft, Illth Cong. §§ 8(b), 9 (2010) (on file with
author).
109. See, e.g., H.R. 1263, 109th Cong. (2005).
110. For example, the Best Practices Act would preempt state laws governing "covered
information." H.R. 5777 § 605(a).
111. 2010 REPORT, supra note 33; DEP'T OF COMMERCE, supra note 10.
112. 2010 Rick Boucher Elections Results, PoLITIcs DAILY (Nov. 9, 2010, 5:37 PM),
http://www.politicsdaily.com/tag/Rick+Boucher/.
113. 15 U.S.C. § 45(a)(1) (2006).
114. FED. TRADE COMM'N, PRIVACY ONLINE: A REPORT TO CONGRESS 2 (1998), avail-
able at http://www.ftc.gov/reports/privacy3/priv-23a.pdf [hereinafter "1998 REPORT"].
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necessary to encourage industry self-regulation but did not recommend
legislation, except with respect to children under twelve."'
In 2000, the FTC addressed the specific issue of online profiling.
The FTC reviewed self-regulatory principles proposed by the NAI and
found that they "reasonably implement the fair information practice
principles."" 6 Nonetheless, the FTC recommended "backstop legislation"
to address those actors not reached by the NAI. Legislation would create
basic standards regarding collection and use of information gathered
online and intended for profiling, create an implementing agency with
rule-making and enforcement authority, and grant a safe harbor to parties
adopting self-regulatory principles that implement the fair information
practices.'
The FTC turned its attention to online profiling again in 2007 fol-
lowing petitions from several organizations and its investigation into the
merger between Google and DoubleClick."" After a period of meetings,
proposals, and public comment, the FTC released a new set of four self-
regulatory principles: transparency and consumer control, reasonable
security and limited data retention for consumer data, affirmative express
consent for material changes to existing privacy promises, and affirma-
tive express consent to (or prohibition against) using sensitive data for
OBA." 9
These principles set very loose standards. For example, the princi-
ples do not apply to "first party" or "intra-site" online profiling, and the
definition of "first party" is very broad.120 It may include affiliated com-
panies if the relationship is "sufficiently transparent and consistent with
reasonable consumer expectations."21 It may even include sharing data
with "third-party service providers in order to deliver ads . . . provided
there is no further use of the data by the service providers." 22 In addition,
the FTC downplayed the importance of "enforcement," demoting it from
fair information principle 23 to a one-and-a-half sentence mention in the
conclusion,124 and the report did not discuss its removal from the list of
principles. Finally, although the report addressed self-regulatory princi-
115. Id.
116. 2000 REPORT PART 2, supra note 7, at 4.
117. Id. at 10-11. No such legislation was ever passed.
118. 2009 REPORT, supra note 2, at 8-9.
119. Id. at46-47.
120. See Stallworth, supra note 2, at 488 (characterizing the change as an "unprece-
dented limitation to the scope of the proposed guidelines").
121. 2009 REPORT, supra note 2, at 28 n.59.
122. Id. at 28 n.58.
123. 1998 REPORT, supra note 114, at 10.
124. 2009 REPORT, supra note 2, at 47.
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pies, the FTC did not take the opportunity to reiterate its previous call
for "backstop legislation."
Along with its issuance of comments and guidelines, the FTC has
brought numerous cases against businesses that failed to protect con-
sumers' personal information. 12 Despite the FTC's arguable successes,
its mandate to consumer protection and not consumer privacy fundamen-
tally limits it.126 Thus, many matters regarding online profiling fall
outside of the FTC's authority. For instance, Google posts both a privacy
policy and a simplified summary that avoids "legalese," both practices
the FTC promotes; however, the policy in practice provides few limits on
OBA. So long as Google complies with its own policy, its practices re-
garding OBA are outside of the FTC's enforcement scope.127
Furthermore, the FTC's settlements with offenders do not bind other par-
ties and "are often no more than slaps on the wrist." 28
In short, despite its numerous studies, meetings, reports, and com-
ments, the FTC's results are ultimately limited to ever-loosening
principles regarding self-regulation and unsuccessful calls for legislation.
Meanwhile, its investigations have neither remedied nor deterred harm-
ful profiling practices.
D. Regulation Is Necessary to Protect Users
This section has established that online profiling is a harmful prac-
tice from which users are unable to effectively protect themselves and
for which there are no legal remedies. Because industry self-regulation
under the notice-and-choice regime has proven inadequate, legislation is
necessary.
Advertisers and others argue that legislation is undesirable because it
would inhibit economic growth.129 Online advertising's economic bene-
fits include subsidization of online content and lower barriers to market
entry for new businesses. 30 A study sponsored by the Interactive Adver-
tising Bureau (IAB) even argues that the jobs of about two percent of
Americans in 2009 existed solely because of the "advertising supported
125. 2010 REPORT, supra note 33, at 10-11.
126. Will Thomas DeVries, Protecting Privacy in the Digital Age, 18 BERKELEY TECH.
L.J. 283, 308 (2003).
127. Stallworth, supra note 2, at 484-87.
128. DeVries, supra note 126, at 308.
129. PONEMON INST., ECONOMIC IMPACT OF PRIVACY ON ONLINE BEHAVIORAL ADVER-
TISING 6 (2010), available at http://www.betteradvertising.com/OBA-paper.pdf.
130. Letter from J. Trevor Hughes, Exec. Dir., Network Adver. Initiative, to Donald S.
Clark, Sec'y, Fed. Trade Comm'n 6-7 (Oct. 19, 2007), available at http://www.ftc.gov/os/
comments/behavioraladvertising/071019nai.pdf; Letter from Michael Zaneis, Vice President of
Pub. Policy, Interactive Adver. Bureau, to Donald S. Clark, Sec'y, Fed. Trade Comm'n 2-3 (Oct.
19, 2007), available at http://www.iab.net/media/filellAB-Behavioral-adverising-comments.pdf.
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Internet.""' These figures are misleading because online profiling repre-
sents only a small percentage of online advertising. Specifically,
although advertising subsidizes much online content and supports a large
industry, these benefits do not derive from online profiling in particular.
One recent study found that the ninety surveyed companies spent an av-
erage of only 11.7% of their online advertising budgets on OBA.'3 1
Furthermore, if advertisers were unable to target users through profiling,
they likely would redirect at least some portion of the funds currently
devoted to OBA to other online advertising avenues, such as delivering
advertisements tied to search results or the general content of a webpage.
Current practices may even be harmful to innovation because they cause
economic loss by undermining consumer trust, which inhibits use of new
services.13 1
Advertisers also argue that users would not pay a market rate for
Internet content if it were not free, which advertisers contend would be
the inevitable result if websites could no longer sell ad space. A study by
the IAB purports to support this argument, finding that the value Ameri-
can and European consumers obtain from web services is six times
greater than what consumers would spend to avoid advertising and its
attendant privacy risks.'3" However, a recent Gallup poll shows that a
sizeable majority of consumers believe that "free access is not worth the
invasion of privacy involved,"'35 demonstrating that the argument is not
as clear-cut as advertisers argue.
The advertising industry and others further contend that legislation
would inhibit technical innovation.3 6 It is true that unregulated develop-
ment of online profiling and OBA has led to several new technologies
and tools, such as the complex algorithms that drive RTB and the Ever-
cookie. However, bald assertions that regulation will inhibit innovation
are not arguments against regulation but rather a statement of regula-
tion's possible effect. It may even have a positive effect; more and better
tracking technologies are not necessarily desirable. Furthermore, the de-
131. HAMILTON CONSULTANTS ET AL., ECONOMIC VALUE OF THE ADVERTISING-
SUPPORTED INTERNET ECOSYSTEM 4 (2009), available at http://www.iab.net/medialfile/
Economic-Value-Report.pdf.
132. PONEMON INST., supra note 129, at 4-5.
133. DEP'T OF COMMERCE, supra note 10, at vi.
134. IAB EUR., CONSUMERS DRIVING THE DIGITAL UPTAKE: THE ECONOMIC VALUE OF
ONLINE ADVERTISING-BASED SERVICES FOR CONSUMERS 5 (2010), available at
http://iabeurope.eu/media/39559/whitepaper%20_Consumerdrivingdigitaluptake-final.pdf.
135. Lymari Morales, U.S. Internet Users Ready to Limit Online Tracking for Ads,
GALLUP (Dec. 21, 2010), http://www.gallup.com/poll/145337/Intemet-Users-Ready-Limit-
Online-Tracking-Ads.aspx.
136. See, e.g., Svetlana Milina, Note, Let the Market Do Its Job: Advocating an Inte-
grated Laissez-Faire Approach to Online Profiling Regulation, 21 CARDOZO ARTS & ENT.
L.J. 257, 272 (2003).
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crease in resources spent on development of tracking technologies may
allow for an increase in resources spent elsewhere. Unregulated online
profiling does not necessarily lead to a net increase in innovation but
rather to a trade-off in the nature of innovation.
Online profiling presents a classic case for regulation: it is a harmful
practice from which consumers cannot protect themselves and for which
there is no existing remedy. The advertising industry has offered three
flawed arguments against regulation of online profiling. First, the adver-
tising industry argues that a reduction in OBA will lead to a
corresponding reduction in subsidized Internet content. However, a de-
crease in OBA will not spell the end of the ad-supported internet
because OBA constitutes only a small portion of online advertising
budgets. Second, the advertising industry argues that users like receiv-
ing OBA. However, surveys show that users do not agree that the
benefits of ad-subsidized Internet content outweigh the loss of privacy.
Finally, the advertising industry argues that innovation of some un-
specified nature will suffer. While innovation in the field of online
profiling and OBA may decrease, other forms of innovation will proba-
bly not. Accordingly, these objections do not overcome the need for
regulation.
III. THE 'Do NoT TRACK' MECHANISM
The FTC has characterized its approach from 1995 through 2010 as
focusing on two elements: notice-and-choice and harm to consumers.
Setting a markedly different tone, the FTC acknowledges in its most re-
cent review that the notice-and-choice model simply has not worked
with respect to online profiling. The FTC cites many of the problems
discussed above: ineffective industry self-regulation, lack of consumer
awareness, and opaque privacy settings, among others.
To avoid these problems, the FTC proposes a "more uniform and
comprehensive consumer choice mechanism for online behavioral adver-
tising," now referred to as the 'do not track' option."' The FTC suggests
that this option could function similarly to a persistent cookie on a user's
browser that informs visited sites whether or not the user permits track-
ing or the delivery of targeted advertising. 39 The remainder of this
137. 2010 REPORT, supra note 33, at 64-66.
138. Id. at 66.
139. Id. Although the FTC describes the 'do not track' mechanism as similar to a persis-
tent cookie, it appears that the purpose is not to block all cookies, which would inhibit users
from enjoying many websites, but instead to inform parties attempting to install cookies that
the user does not wish to be tracked.
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section suggests ways in which this could be implemented in order to
give consumers effective options regarding online profiling.
A. Design of the 'Do Not Track' Mechanism
It appears that the FTC would require any party not acting under
"commonly accepted" practicesl40 to respect the user's tracking prefer-
ences. Commonly accepted practices include first-party marketing,
which the FTC proposes should "include only the collection of data from
a consumer with whom the company interacts directly for purposes of
marketing to that consumer." 4' Thus, many business affiliates and all
third parties, other than service providers, would be unable to track users
who opt out through the 'do not track' mechanism.142 This standard
should be supported, with the exception that tracking by business affili-
ates, even those whose "affiliate relationship is clear to consumers
through common branding or similar means," 43 should not be permitted.
Tracking by affiliates opens too many questions and loopholes regarding
whether affiliations are apparent to consumers.
The 'do not track' mechanism should be implemented through legis-
lation rather than voluntary industry compliance. The FTC suggests that
"robust, enforceable self regulation" is an option. The Department of
Commerce suggests that such a standard would be effective if there were
proper incentives for compliance, such as enhanced FTC enforcement,
provision of safe harbors for the adoption of certain minimal standards,
and increased pressure from Executive officials on industry to develop
standards.'" This approach is inadequate; the advertising industry has
shown that it cannot be relied upon to design and implement an effective
mechanism that will protect consumer privacy. Even under the more le-
nient notice-and-choice regime, the FTC found that self-regulatory
efforts had "fallen short," 45 and the Department of Commerce noted that
the NAI principles are the "only significant example of a voluntary code
of conduct." 46 The reason is simple: the online advertising industry en-
joys greater profits from targeted advertising than other forms of
advertising, and so it is in the industry's interest to make it difficult for
consumers to prevent profiling.147 A centralized and disinterested stan-
140. Id. at 53-54.
141. Id. at 55.
142. Id.
143. Id.
144. DEP'T OF COMMERCE, supra note 10, at 42.
145. 2010 REPORT, supra note 33, at 64.
146. DEP'T OF COMMERCE, supra note 10, at 42 (emphasis in original).
147. It is not certain that the online advertising industry would be solely responsible for
the design or implementation of a 'do not track' mechanism. However, it is likely that a party
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dard-setting body, whether it is Congress acting through specific legisla-
tion or a government agency acting with rule-making authority, would
minimize self-interested decisions by the industry. In order to maintain
flexible standards that can adapt to developing technologies, Congress
should establish basic standards and endow an agency, likely the FTC,
with rule-making authority to implement those standards.14
The basic standards should include a requirement that all Internet
applications provide a 'do not track' mechanism. This requirement
should extend to browsers, mobile applications, and other means of ac-
cessing the Internet.'49 An ever-increasing range of devices and
technologies enable online activities, and exempting these growing fields
would leave a major gap in the legislation. Through the remainder of this
section, "Internet application" will refer to any means of accessing the
Internet.
Any Internet application installed or updated after the legislation
takes effect should automatically display the mechanism to users the first
time it is opened.5 o This will ensure that consumers are aware of the op-
tions that exist, making it a valuable supplement to any consumer
education campaign. The mechanism should remain easily accessible
thereafter.
The mechanism must present three options: allow all tracking, allow
tracking by certain companies, and deny all tracking. Delivery of OBA is
not, in and of itself, a bad thing; the harms identified above stem from
lack of user control over their information and an inability to escape the
"box." Allowing users to select the companies that can track them would
narrowly address the harms associated with unrestricted tracking by
granting users control over their information. It would also meet users'
desires: a recent Gallup poll indicates that forty-seven percent of Ameri-
cans want to allow tracking by advertisers of their choice.'
designing such a mechanism would find it necessary to consult with the advertising industry.
Furthermore, companies might own both browsers and advertising companies-Google owns
both Chrome and DoubleClick, for example-giving them an incentive to hinder their brows-
ers' compliance.
148. It is important that Congress create these standards. The Department of Commerce
calls for the creation of a "Privacy Policy Office" (PPO). The PPO would work with stake-
holders to propose new codes, which would undergo comment and review periods. If
approved, the FTC would enforce the code; if the process does not result in an enforceable
code, the PPO would recommend FTC rules or legislation. DEP'T OF COMMERCE, supra note
10, at 48. This would simply insert an extra step into the development of rules, delaying the
creation of important standards. Adequate opportunities for comment and consensus-building
exist in current notice-and-comment periods.
149. The FTC questions whether this is necessary. 2010 REPORT, supra note 33, at 68-
69.
150. It is unclear whether there is a way to require users to update existing browsers.
151. Morales, supra note 135.
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Allowing users to select which companies may track them does put
some burden on users to learn about the companies' practices, and so it
is necessary to take a number of complementary steps to prevent a de
facto return to the current, ineffective "notice-and-choice" regime. The
Department of Commerce has called for a comprehensive new approach
to privacy, which might address these concerns. Among other recom-
mendations, the report calls for greater transparency through shorter and
clearer disclosures, user-friendly interfaces, and "Privacy Impact As-
sessment specifications," which would provide users with "a road map to
an organization's collection and use of personal information." 52 How-
ever, disclosure alone is not enough. An entity that states it will do
anything it likes with users' information is hardly protecting privacy,
though it is providing full disclosure.'53 The Department of Commerce
calls for purpose specification and use limitation. "Purpose specifica-
tion" would require companies to state with specificity the purposes for
which they collect information; "use limitation" prohibits companies
from using gathered information for any other purpose.15 4 Finally, the
Department of Commerce suggests that audits could verify-and pro-
vide incentives for-compliance with purpose specification and use
limitations.' 5 Taken together, these requirements would present users
with clear explanations of how and why companies collect information,
what they intend to do with it, and whether they adhere to their state-
ments. This is an effective "notice" regime.
As for "choice," users could simply disallow tracking by those com-
panies whose practices are distasteful. While most users will not have
the time to familiarize themselves with each company's practices, users
may have the option to rely upon lists assembled by privacy advocacy
groups,'5 6 who would have the time and resources to review companies'
practices. Such an option is not objectionable when accompanied by a
choice to block all tracking, not merely tracking by companies found on
third-party lists.'17
Note that the mechanism should allow users to consent to tracking
only by specified companies. The mechanism should not allow users to
agree to tracking based on specified categories of interests or data type.
Such standards would be unworkable. For example, if a user allows
152. DEP'T OF COMMERCE, supra note 10, at 36.
153. Id. at 38.
154. Id. at 38-40.
155. Id. at 40.
156. Tanzina Vega, Microsoft, Spurred by Privacy Concerns, Introduces Tracking Pro-
tection to Its Browser, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 7, 2010, at B6, available at http://www.nytimes.
com/2010/12/08/business/media/08soft.html?_r- I &hpw.
157. See supra text accompanying note 80.
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tracking regarding gardening, may trackers gather information about the
user from any sites related to gardening? If so, may trackers collect only
information providing more specific details regarding the user's interest
in gardening, such as whether they have an orchard or a houseplant?
May trackers identify users on websites not related to gardening in order
to display advertising related to gardening? Defining other categories of
permitted tracking is similarly unworkable. Allowing blanket collection
of non-sensitive information would invite disputes regarding the defini-
tion of "sensitive."'5" Blanket collection of non-PII information would be
an empty standard, as all information is nearly-PII; aggregating even
small amounts of non-PII can produce PII information.19 Allowing users
to permit collection of discrete pieces of data, such as their location,
would invite exploitation of users who do not understand the ways in
which information may be aggregated. With respect to any of these op-
tions, it is not clear with whom trackers may share gathered information
and whether there are limits on recipients' use of that information. In
short, allowing limited tracking based on user-specified categories would
appear to open more doors than it closes or, at the very least, to invite
unmanageable difficulties in defining terms and setting limits.
In addition, the mechanism should not allow users to consent to
third-party tracking while they are visiting certain sites. Such a system
would limit user control because users would not necessarily know
which third-party trackers were present. It would also give websites an
incentive to require users to allow tracking in order to use their sites,
further undermining user control.
In presenting these options to users, the mechanism should be brief
and readily understandable. The more options the mechanism provides,
the more confusing it may be.'60 An acceptably simple yet accurate sys-
tem might present a single screen with a one-paragraph description of
online profiling and links to more specific information. There should be
three boxes following this paragraph: one that permits all tracking, one
that permits tracking by certain companies, and one that does not permit
any tracking. If a user indicates a desire to permit tracking by certain
companies, the user should be presented with a page allowing him to
select individual companies or to select groups of companies based upon
158. Compare Best Practices Act, H.R. 5777, 111th Cong. § 2(8) (2010) (including a
broader range of sensitive information, such as sexual behavior in addition to sexual orienta-
tion, but requiring that it "relate directly" to the characteristic in question), with
Boucher/Stearns Discussion Draft, 11Ith Cong. § 2(10) (2010) (on file with author) (including
a narrower range, such as sexual orientation but not sexual behavior, but only requiring that
the information "relate" to the characteristic in question). The FTC continues to seek input on
how to adequately define "sensitive information." 2010 REPORT, supra note 33, at 61.
159. Ohm, supra note 62, at 1719-20.
160. See supra, notes 76-78 and accompanying text.
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their compliance with certain privacy practices or approval by privacy
advocacy groups. The FTC or other rule-making body would have the
authority to set specific standards to accomplish this.
Websites will thwart the purpose of a 'do not track' mechanism if
they are able to deny access to users who did not permit tracking, since
necessary or popular sites might then compel users to permit tracking in
order to access the sites. Therefore, websites should not be permitted to
block users who do not allow tracking or to condition full access on us-
ers' consent to tracking by certain companies. Websites should not
suffer a significant loss of revenue from this, as they are still free to dis-
play context- or search-based advertising, as well as targeted advertising
to those users who allow it. If, however, websites do choose to charge
users who have opted out of tracking, the websites may not charge un-
reasonable fees in order to coerce users into permitting tracking.
Coercion may be determined by reference both to the amount of money
charged and interference with the browsing process, such as requiring
users to complete a separate transaction each time they navigate to a dif-
ferent page within the site.
B. Enforcement of the 'Do Not Track'Mechanism
There must be a way to ensure compliance with the 'do not track'
mechanism. The FTC apparently confines its envisioned enforcement to
technical tools that limit websites' abilities to track objecting users.162
This is inadequate; there must be some means of obtaining legal and eq-
uitable remedies against parties that do not comply, or the industry will
continue to be "the fox guarding the hen-house."
The FTC ought to retain its authority over unfair and deceptive trade
practices with respect to the 'do not track' mechanism. This enforcement
authority should apply against both tracking that evades the 'do not
track' mechanism and browsers whose mechanisms do not meet basic
standards.
Legislation should permit states' attorneys general to seek damages
and injunctions against further violations. Internet applications should be
liable if they know that their mechanism is ineffective but do not correct
it; compliance with relevant FTC regulations will act as a safe harbor.
161. Cf H.R. 5777 § 103(f) (allowing full access to be contingent upon permission to
collect covered information).
162. 2010 REPORT, supra note 33, at 64.
163. Ethan Hayward, Note, The Federal Government as Cookie Inspector: The Con-
sumer Privacy Protection Act of 2000, 11 DEPAUL-LCA J. ART & ENT. L. & POL'Y 227, 233
(2001); see also DEP'T OF COMMERCE, supra note 10, at 43 (suggesting that if a safe harbor
protects companies whose privacy policies meet certain standards, "the 'carrot' offered by a
safe harbor has force only if there is a corresponding 'stick"').
Spring 2011] A Path Toward User Control of Online Profiling
Parties who track users despite their use of the 'do not track' mechanism
should face strict liability. This will encourage browsers to ensure that
their mechanisms are effective but will not deter innovation and entry
into the market.
Damages should be awarded on a per-violation basis with the option
to triple them if a pattern or practice of violation is shown.'" If any cap is
set, it should be high enough that it will still have a deterrent effect on
actors that are worth billions of dollars, such as Google.' A cap propor-
tional to the parties' online advertising budget might be appropriate.
Private rights of action would be of limited use, as many consumers
will not be aware of impermissible tracking and the injury suffered may
not be large enough to bring suit. Nonetheless, private actions should be
permitted so as to allow users who have been injured to vindicate their
right to prevent tracking. This would also compensate for under-
enforcement by federal and state agencies.'6 Finally, it would provide an
opportunity for privacy advocacy groups to intervene on behalf of indi-
viduals.
CONCLUSION
Online profiling is a dangerous practice. It permits the collection of
vast quantities of information regarding largely unsuspecting or unwill-
ing users, and there are currently no adequate safeguards to protect them.
This Note focused on the harms stemming from lack of consumer
knowledge, consent, and ability to employ self-protective measures. The
FTC's 'do not track' mechanism has the potential to address many of
these concerns, but it will not be effective unless implemented by legis-
lation that mandates certain basic standards and supports those standards
with effective enforcement mechanisms.
Of course, presenting users with options to avoid some or all track-
ing will only be effective if users are able to make informed decisions.
Given the pervasiveness of the Internet, users are almost shockingly
ignorant of online profiling and privacy practices."' Requiring Internet
164. This is the method followed in New York's Online Consumer Protection Act, Gen.
Assemb. B. A4809, 2011 Leg., 234th Reg. Sess. (N.Y. 2011).
165. The $5 million cap proposed in the Best Practices Act seems too small for this
reason. H.R. 5777 § 603(b)(3). One survey found that seventy percent of Americans believe a
company that purchases or uses someone's information illegally should be fined more than
$2500, although it is unclear whether this question refers to a single violation or repeated
ones. Turow et al., supra note 47, at 23. In addition, a substantial minority (thirty-eight per-
cent) believes executives should face criminal liability. Id.
166. DEP'T OF COMMERCE, supra note 10, at 29.
167. Turow et al., supra note 47, at 19-22.
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applications to present users with a simple list of options will at least
encourage users to make a purposeful choice, but it will not necessarily
provide the background they need. Because users will be able to allow
some or all tracking, they must know enough about the harms and al-
leged benefits of online profiling to make an informed decision
regarding the degree of protection of their privacy online. Accordingly,
consumer education campaigns should complement the 'do not track'
mechanism. 68
The harms of online profiling extend beyond those discussed in this
Note. The industry depends upon the accumulation, storage, and dis-
semination of vast quantities of information, an alarming practice given
the current lack of standards regarding data retention and data security.
Future legislation should make the 'do not track' mechanism just one
part of a comprehensive plan to protect users' information. This can all
be accomplished without destroying the advertising-supported Internet,
to which online profiling and OBA contribute only a small percentage.
168. 2010 REPORT, supra note 33, at 78-79; DEP'T OF COMMERCE, supra note 10, at 48.
